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Resumen. El infinito como método en la teoría de conjuntos y la matemática 
Este artículo da cuenta de la aparición histórica de lo infinito en la teoría de conjuntos, y de cómo lo 
tratamos dentro y fuera de las matemáticas. La primera sección analiza el surgimiento de lo infinito 
como una cuestión de método en la teoría de conjuntos. La segunda sección analiza el infinito 
dentro y fuera de las matemáticas, y cómo deben adoptarse. 
Palabras clave: infinito, la teoría de conjuntos, matemáticas.
Abstract
This article address the historical emergence of the infinite in set theory, and how we are to take 
the infinite in and out of mathematics.The first section discusses the emergence of the infinite as a 
matter of method in set theory.  The second section discusses the infinite in and out of mathematics, 
and how it is to be taken.
Key words: infinite, set theory, mathematics.
The infinite, of course, is a large topic. At the outset, one can historically discern two 
overlapping clusters of concepts: (1) wholeness, completeness, universality, absoluteness. 
(2) endlessness, boundlessness, indivisibility, continuousness. The first, the metaphysical 
infinite, I will set aside. It is the second, the mathematical infinite, that I will address. 
Furthermore, I will address this by considering the historical emergence of the infinite in 
set theory, and how we are to take the infinite in and out of mathematics. Insofar as physics 
and, more broadly, science deals with the mathematical infinite through mathematical 
language and techniques, my remarks should be subsuming and consequent.
 The main underlying point will be that how the mathematical infinite is approached, 
assimilated, and applied in mathematics is not a matter of “ontological commitment”, of 
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coming to terms with whatever that might mean, but rather of epistemological articulation, 
of coming to terms through knowledge. The mathematical infinite in mathematics is a matter 
of method. How we deal with the specific individual issues involving the infinite turns on 
the narrative we present about how it fits into mathematical frameworks established and 
being established.
 The first section discusses the emergence of the infinite as a matter of method in set 
theory.  The second section discusses the infinite in and out of mathematics, and how it is 
to be taken.
1. The Emergence of the Infinite in Mathematics
What role does the infinite play in modern mathematics? In modern mathematics, infinite 
sets abound both in the workings of proofs and as subject matter in statements, and so do 
universal statements, often of ∀$ form, which are indicative of direct engagement with the 
infinite. In many ways the role of the infinite is importantly “second-order” in the sense 
that Frege regarded number generally, in that the concepts of modern mathematics are 
understood as having infinite instances over a broad range.
 But all this has been the case for only about a century. Infinite totalities and operations 
on them only emerged in mathematics in a recent period of algebraic expansion and 
rigorization of proof. It becomes germane, even crucial, to see how the infinite emerged 
through interaction with proof to come to see that the infinite in mathematics is a matter 
of method. If one puts the history of mathematics through the sieve of proof, one sees the 
emergence of methods drawing in the mathematical infinite, and the mathematical infinite 
came in at three levels: the countably infinite, the infinite of the natural numbers; the 
continuum, the infinite of analysis; and the empyrean infinite of higher set theory.
 As a thematic entrée into the matter of proof and the countably infinite, we can consider 
the Pigeonhole Principle: 
   If n pigeons fly into fewer than n pigeonholes, then one hole has more than one pigeon.
Taken primordially, this may be considered immediate as part of the meaning of the 
natural numbers and requires no proof. On the other hand, after its first explicit uses in 
algebraic number theory in mid-19th Century, it has increased in prominence in modern 
combinatorics, its consequences considered substantive and at times quite surprising given 
its immediacy. Rendered as a ∀$ statement about natural numbers, it however does not 
have the feel of a basic law of arithmetic but of a “non-constructive” existence assertion, 
and today it is at the heart of combinatorics, and indeed is the beginning of Ramsey 
Theory, a field full of non-constructive existence assertions.
 So how does one prove the Pigeonhole Principle? For 1729 pigeons and 137 pigeonholes 
one can systematically generate all assignments from {1,...,1729} to {1,...,137} and check 
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that there are always at least two pigeons assigned to the same pigeonhole. But we “see” 
nothing here, nor from any other particular brute force analysis. With the Pigeonhole 
Principle seen afresh as being at the heart of the articulation of finite cardinality and requiring 
proof based on prior principles, Richard Dedekind in his celebrated 1888 essay Was sind 
und was sollen die Zahlen? (120) first gave a proof applying mathematical induction on 
n. Today, the Pigeonhole Principle is regarded as a theorem of Peano Arithmetic (PA).  In 
fact, in the presence of the elementary axioms of PA, the Pigeonhole Principle is equivalent 
to the central Principle of Induction. Moreover, the proof complexity of weak forms of the 
Pigeonhole Principle have been investigated in weak systems of arithmetic.1 
 This raises a notable historical point drawing in the infinite. The Pigeonhole Principle 
seems to have been first applied in mathematics by  Gustav Lejeune Dirichlet in papers of 
1842, one to the study of Pell’s equation and another to establish a crucial approximation 
lemma for his well-known Unit Theorem describing the group of units of an algebraic 
number field.2 The principle occurred in Dirichlet’s Vorlesungen über Zahlentheorie, edited 
and published after his death by Dedekind in 1863. The occurrence is in the second, 1871 
edition, in a short Supplement VIII by Dedekind on Pell’s equation, and it was in the 
famous Supplement X that Dedekind laid out his theory of ideals in algebraic number 
theory, in which he worked directly with infinite totalities. In 1872 Dedekind was putting 
together Was sind, and he would be the first to define “infinite set”, with the definition 
being a set for which there is a one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset. This is just 
the negation of the Pigeonhole Principle. Dedekind in effect had inverted a negative aspect 
of finite cardinality into a positive existence definition of the infinite.
 The Pigeonhole Principle example brings out a crucial point about method. The proof 
by induction is an example of what Hilbert called formal induction. Insofar as the natural 
numbers do have an antecedent sense, a universal statement ∀nf(n) about them should 
be correlated with all the informal counterparts f(0),f(1),f(2),... taken together. We have 
seen that, at least for existence statements f(n), this may become intensionally problematic 
for particular instantiations. Contra Poincaré, Hilbert in his 1928 distinguished between 
contentual [inhaltlich] induction, the intuitive construction of each integer as numeral,3  
and formal induction, by which ∀nf(n) follows immediately from the two statements f(0) 
and ∀n(f(n) → f(n+1)) and “through which alone the mathematical variable can begin 
to play its role in the formal system.” In the case of the Pigeonhole Principle, we see 
the proof by formal induction, but it bears little constructive relation to any particular 
1 See for example Maciel-Pitassi-Woods (2002).
2 See Dirichlet 1889/97, pp.579,636. The principle in the early days was called the Schubfachprinzip 
(``drawer principle’’), though not however by Dirichlet. The second, 1899 edition of Heinrich Weber’s 
Lehrbuch der Algebra used the words ``in Faecher verteilen’’ (``to distribute into boxes’’) and Ed-
mund Landau’s 1927 Vorlesungen über Zahlentheorie had ``Schubfachschluss’’.
3 For Hilbert, the numeral for the integer n consists of n short vertical strokes concatenated together.
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instance. Be that as it may, the schematic sense of the countably infinite, the infinite of 
the natural numbers, is carried in modern mathematics by formal induction, a principle 
used everywhere in combinatorics and computer science to secure statements about the 
countably infinite. There is no larger mathematical sense to the Axiom of Infinity in set 
theory other than to provide an extensional counterpart to formal induction, a method of 
proof. The Cantorian move against the traditional conception of the natural numbers as 
having no end in the “after” sense is neatly rendered by extensionalizing induction itself in 
modern set theory with the ordinal ω, with “after” recast as membership.
 The next level of the mathematical infinite would be the continuum, the infinite 
of mathematical analysis. Bringing together the two traditional Aristotlean infinities of 
infinite divisibility and of infinite progression, one can ask: How many points are there 
on the line? This would seem to be a fundamental, even primordial, question. However, 
to cast it as a mathematical question, underlying concepts would have to be invested with 
mathematical sense and a way of mathematical thinking provided that makes an answer 
possible, if not informative. First, the real numbers as representing points on the linear 
continuum would have to be precisely described. A coherent concept of cardinality and 
cardinal number would have to be developed for infinite mathematical totalities. Finally, 
the real numbers would have to be enumerated in such a way so as to accommodate 
this concept of cardinality. Georg Cantor made all of these moves as part of the seminal 
advances that have led to modern set theory. His Continuum Hypothesis would propose 
a specific, structured resolution about the size of the continuum in terms of his transfinite 
numbers, a resolution that would become pivotal where set-theoretic approaches to the 
continuum became prominent in mathematical investigations. 
 Set theory had its beginnings in the great 19th Century transformation of mathematics, 
a transformation beginning in analysis. With the function concept having been steadily 
extended beyond analytic expressions to infinite series, sense for the new functions could 
only be developed through carefully specific deductive procedures. Proof reemerged in 
mathematics as an extension of algebraic calculation and became the basis of mathematical 
knowledge, promoting new abstractions and generalizations. The new articulations to be 
secured by proof and proof in turn to be based on prior principles, the regress lead in the 
early  1870s to the appearance of several definitions of the real numbers, of which Cantor’s 
and Dedekind’s are the best known. It is at first quite striking that the real numbers as a 
totality came to be developed so late, but this can be viewed against the background of the 
larger conceptual shift from intensional to extensional mathematics, that is, from rules to 
objects. Infinite series outstripping sense, it became necessary to adopt an arithmetical view 
of the continuum given extensionally as a totality of points.   
 Cantor’s definition of the real numbers appeared in his seminal paper 1872 on 
trigonometric series; proceeding in terms of fundamental sequences, he laid the basis 
for his theorems on sequential convergence. Dedekind in his 1872 formulated the real 
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numbers in terms of his cuts to express the completeness of the continuum; deriving 
the least upper bound principle as a simple consequence, he thereby secured the basic 
properties of continuous functions. In the use of arbitrary sequences and infinite totalities, 
both Cantor’s and Dedekind’s objectifications of the continuum helped set the stage 
for the subsequent development of that extensional mathematics  par excellence, set 
theory. Cantor’s formulation was no idle conceptualization, but to the service of specific 
mathematics, the articulation of his results on  uniqueness of trigonometric series involving 
his derived sets, the first instance of topological closure. Dedekind describes how he came 
to his formulation much earlier, but also acknowledges Cantor’s work. In modern terms, 
Cantor’s reals are equivalence classes according to an equivalence relation which importantly 
is a congruence relation, a relation that respects the arithmetical structure of the reals. It 
is through Cantor’s definition that completeness would be articulated for general metric 
spaces, thereby providing the guidelines for proof in new contexts involving infinite sets.
 Set theory was born on that day in December 1873 when Cantor established that the 
continuum is not countable: There is no one-to-one correspondence between the natural 
numbers N = {0,1,2,3,...} and the real numbers R. Like the irrationality of the square 
root of 2, the uncountability of the continuum was an impossibility result established via 
reductio ad absurdum that opened up new possibilities. Cantor addressed a specific problem, 
embedded in the mathematics of the time, in his seminal paper 1874 entitled “On a 
property of the totality of all real algebraic numbers”. Dirichlet’s algebraic numbers, it will 
be remembered, are the roots of polynomials with integer coefficients; Cantor established 
the countability of the algebraic numbers. This was the first substantive correlation of an 
infinite totality with the natural numbers, and it was the first application of what now 
goes without saying, that finite words based on a countable alphabet are countable. Cantor 
then established: For any (countable) sequence of reals, every interval contains a real not in the 
sequence. The following is Cantor’s argument, in brief: 
Suppose that s is a sequence of reals and I an interval. Let a < b be the first two reals of 
s, if any, in I. Then let a’ < b’ be the first two reals of s, if any, in the open interval (a,b); 
a’’< b’’$ the first two reals of s, if any, in (a’,b’); and so forth. Then however long this 
process continues, the intersection of the nested intervals must contain a real not in the 
sequence s.
Cantor went on, of course, to develop his concept of cardinality based on one-to-one 
correspondence. Having made the initial breach with a negative result about the lack of 
a one-to-one correspondence, he turned infinite cardinality into a positive concept and 
investigated the possibilities for one-to-one correspondences. Just as the discovery of 
the irrational numbers had led to one of the great achievements of Greek mathematics, 
Eudoxus’s theory of geometric proportions, Cantor began his move toward a full-blown 
mathematical theory of the infinite. Cantor notably established that there is a one-to-one 
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correspondence between the line and the plane, and generally Rn, and this stimulated the 
study of dimension and the possibilities of continuous correspondences eventually leading 
to the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. By his 1878 Beitrag Cantor had come to the focal 
Continuum Hypothesis. In his 1883 Grundlagen Cantor developed the transfinite numbers 
and the key concept of well-ordering, in significant part to take a structured approach to 
infinite cardinality and the Continuum Hypothesis. He developed the number classes by 
bundling the transfinite numbers together according to cardinality, and then propounded 
this basic well-ordering principle: “It is always possible to bring any well-defined set into 
the form of a well-ordered set.” Sets are to be well-ordered, and they and their cardinalities 
are to be gauged via the transfinite numbers of his structured conception of the infinite.
 Almost two decades after his 1874 Cantor in a short note 1891 gave his now celebrated 
diagonal argument, establishing Cantor’s Theorem: For any set X the totality of functions 
from X into a fixed two-element set has a larger cardinality than X, i.e. there is no one-
to-one correspondence between the two. This result generalized his 1874 result that the 
continuum is not countable, since the totality of functions from N into a fixed two-element 
set has the same cardinality as R. In retrospect the diagonal argument can be drawn out 
from the 1874 proof:
 Starting with a sequence s of reals and a half-open interval I0, instead of 
successively choosing delimiting pairs of reals in the sequence, avoid the members of 
s one at a time: Let I1 be the left or right half-open subinterval of I0 demarcated by its 
midpoint, whichever does not contain the first element of s. Then let I2 be the left or 
right half-open subinterval of I1 demarcated by its midpoint, whichever does not contain 
the second element of s; and so forth. Again, the nested intersection contains a real not 
in the sequence s. Abstracting the process in terms of reals in binary expansion, one is just 
generating the binary digits of the diagonalizing real.4 
Cantor had been shifting his notion of set to a level of abstraction beyond sets of reals and 
the like, and the casualness of his 1891 may reflect an underlying cohesion with his 1874. 
Whether the new proof is really “different” from the earlier one, through this abstraction 
Cantor could now dispense with the recursively defined nested sets and limit construction, 
and he could apply his argument to any set. He had proved for the first time that there is 
a cardinality larger than that of R, and moreover affirmed “the general theorem, that the 
powers of well-defined sets have no maximum.” Thus, Cantor for the first time entertained 
4.	 Cantor	first	gave	a	proof	of	the	uncountability	of	the	reals	in	a	letter	to	Dedekind	of	7	December	1873	
(Ewald	1996	pp.845ff),	professing	that	“.	.	.	only	today	do	I	believe	myself	to	have	finished	with	the	
thing . . .”. It is remarkable that in this letter already appears a doubly indexed array of real numbers 
and a procedure for traversing the array downward and to the right, as in a now common picturing of 
the diagonal proof.
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the third level of the mathematical infinite, the empyrean level, beyond the continuum, of 
higher set theory.
 Nowadays it goes without saying that each function from a set X into a two-element 
set corresponds to a subset of X, so Cantor’s Theorem is usually stated as: For any set X 
its power set, the totaity of all of its subsets, has a larger cardinality than X. However, it 
would be an exaggeration to assert that Cantor at this point was working on  power sets; 
rather, he was expanding the 19th Century concept of function by ushering in arbitrary 
functions. At the end of his 1891 Cantor had dealt explicitly  with “all” functions with 
a specified domain X and range {0,1}; regarded these as being enumerated by one super-
function Φ(x,z) with enumerating variable z; and formulated the diagonalizing function 
g(x) = 1 - Φ(x,x)$. This argument, even to its notation, would become method, flowing 
into descriptive set theory, the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem, and recursion theory, the 
paradigmatic means of transcendence over an established context.
 The first decade of the new century saw Ernst Zermelo make his major advances in the 
development of set theory. In his 1904 Zermelo analyzed Cantor’s well-ordering principle 
by reducing it to the Axiom of Choice (AC), the abstract existence assertion that every set 
X has a choice function, i.e. a function f such that for every non-empty Y ∈ X, f(Y) ∈ Y. 
Zermelo thereby shifted the notion of set away from Cantor’s principle that every well-
defined set is well-orderable and replaced that principle by an explicit axiom. His Well-
Ordering Theorem showed specifically that a set is well-orderable exactly when its power 
set has a choice function. How AC brought to the fore issues about the non-constructive 
existence of functions is well-known, and how AC became increasingly accepted in 
mathematics has been well-documented. The expansion of mathematics into large abstract 
contexts was navigated with axioms and proofs, and this led to more and more appeals to 
AC.
 In his 1908 Zermelo published the first full-fledged axiomatization of set theory, partly 
to establish set theory as a discipline free of the emerging paradoxes and particularly to 
put his Well-Ordering Theorem on a firm footing. In addition to codifying generative 
set-theoretic principles, a substantial motive for Zermelo’s axiomatizing set theory was 
to buttress his Well-Ordering Theorem by making explicit its underlying set existence 
assumptions.5 Initiating the first major transmutation of the notion of set after Cantor, 
Zermelo thereby ushered in a new abstract, prescriptive view of sets as structured solely 
by membership and governed and generated by axioms, a view that would soon come to 
dominate. Thus, proof played a crucial role by stimulating an axiomatization of a field of 
study and a corresponding transmutation of its underlying notions.
 In the tradition of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry, Zermelo’s axiomatization was 
in the manner of an implicit definition, with axioms providing rules for procedure and 
5. Moore 1982 pp.155ff supports this contention using items from Zermelo’s Nachlass.
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generating sets and thereby laying the basis for proofs. Fully two decades earlier Dedekind 
in his essay Was sind had provided certain rules for dealing with his sets [Systeme], and 
several overlapping aspects can serve as points of departure for Zermelo’s axiomatization. 
Both Dedekind and Zermelo set down rules for sets in large part to articulate arguments 
involving simple set operations like “set of”, union, and intersection. In particular, both had 
to argue for the equality of sets resulting after involved manipulations, and extensionality 
became operationally necessary. However vague the initial descriptions of sets, sets are to be 
determined solely by their elements, and the membership question is to be determinate.6 
The looseness of Dedekind’s description of sets allowed him in Was sind (66) the latitude 
as it were to “prove” the existence of infinite sets, but Zermelo just stated the Axiom of 
Infinity as a set existence principle. 
 The main point of departure has to do with the larger issue of the role of proof for 
articulating sets. Like algebraic constructs, sets were new to mathematics and would be 
incorporated by setting down the rules for their proofs. Just as calculations are part of the 
sense of numbers, so proofs would be part of the sense of sets, as their “calculations”. Just 
as Euclid’s axioms for geometry had set out the permissible geometric constructions, the 
axioms of set theory would set out the specific rules for set generation and manipulation. But 
unlike the emergence of mathematics from marketplace arithmetic and Greek geometry, 
sets and transfinite numbers were neither laden nor buttressed with substantial antecedents. 
Like strangers in a strange land stalwarts developed a familiarity with them guided hand in 
hand by their axiomatic framework. For Dedekind in Was sind it had sufficed to work with 
sets by merely giving a few definitions and properties, those foreshadowing Extensionality, 
Union, and Infinity. Zermelo provided more rules: Separation, Power Set, and Choice.
 The standard axiomatization ZFC was completed by 1930, with the Axiom of 
Replacement brought in through the work of von Neumann and the Axiom of Foundation, 
through axiomatizations of Zermelo and Bernays. The Cantorian transfinite is contextualized 
by von Neumann’s incorporation of his ordinals and the Axiom of Replacement, which 
underpins transfinite induction and recursion as methods of proof and definition.  And 
Foundation provides the basis for applying transfinite recursion and induction procedures 
to get results about all sets, they all appearing in the cumulative hierarchy. One is simply 
extending methods through limit points, and the seeming exacerbation of the breach into 
the actual infinite amounts to new rules and methods for proofs. From this point of view, 
the Axiom of Choice can be regarded as a similarly necessary principle for infusing the 
contextualized transfinite with the order already inherent in the finite.
6.  Dedekind in Was sind begins a footnote to his statement about extensional determination with: “In 
what manner this determination is brought about, and whether we know a way of deciding upon it, is 
a matter of indifference for all that follows; the general laws to be developed in no way depend upon 
it; they hold under all circumstances.”
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2. The Infinite In and Out of Mathematics
It is evident that mathematics has been much inspired by problems and conjectures and 
has progressed autonomously through the communication of proofs and the assimilation 
of methods. Being socially and historically contingent, mathematics has advanced when 
individuals could collectively make mathematics out of concepts, whether they involve 
infinite totalities or not. The commitment to the infinite is to what is communicable about 
it, to the procedures and methods in articulated contexts, to language and argument. 
Infinite sets are what they do, and their sense is carried in the methods we collectively 
employ on their behalf. 
 When considering the infinite as method in modern mathematics and its relation to the 
primordial mathematical infinite, there is a deep irony about mathematical objects and their 
existence. Through the rigor and precision of modern mathematics, mathematical objects 
achieve a sharp delineation in mathematical practice as founded on proof. The contextual 
objectification then promotes, perhaps even urges, some larger sense of reification. Or, there 
is confrontation with some prior held belief or sense about existence that then promotes a 
skeptical attitude about what    mathematicians do and prove, especially about the infinite. 
Whether mathematics inadvertently promotes realist attitudes or not, the applicability of 
mathematics to science should not extend to philosophy if the issues have to do with 
existence itself, for again, existence in mathematics is contextual and governed by rules and 
procedures, and metaphysical existence, especially concerning the infinite, does not inform 
and is not informed by mathematical work.
 Mathematicians themselves are prone to move in and out of mathematics in their 
existential assessments, stimulated by their work and the urge to put a larger stamp of 
significance to it. We quoted Hilbert above, and he famously expressed larger metaphysical 
views about finitism and generated a program to establish the overall consistency of 
mathematics. In set theory, Cantor staked out the Absolute, which he associated with 
the transcendence of God, and applied it in the guise of the class of all ordinal numbers 
for delineative purposes. Gödel attributed to his conceptual realism about sets and his 
philosophical standpoint generally his relative consistency results with the constructible 
universe. What are we to make of what mathematicians say and their motivations? 
Despite the directions in which mathematics has been led by individuals’ motivations it is 
crucial to point out, again, that what has been retained and has grown in mathematics is 
communicable as proofs and results. We should assess the role of the individual, but keep 
in mind the larger autonomy of mathematics. A delicate but critical point here is that, as 
with writers and musicians, we should be dispassionate, sometimes even skeptical, about 
what mathematicians say about their craft. As with the surface Platonism often espoused 
by mathematicians, we must distinguish what is said from what is done.  
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The interplay between philosophical views of individual mathematicians, historically 
speaking, and the space of philosophical possibility, both in their times and now, is what 
needs to be explored.
 There is one basic standpoint about the infinite which seems to underly others and 
leads to prolonged debates about the “epistemic”. This is the (Kantian) standpoint of 
human finitude. We are cast into a world which as a whole must be infinite, yet we are 
evidently finite, even to the number of particles that makes us up. So how can we come to 
know the infinite in any substantive way? This long-standing attitude is part of a venerable 
tradition, and to the extent that we move against it our approach may be viewed as bold 
and iconoclastic. Even phenomenologically, we see before us mathematicians working 
coherently and substantially with infinite sets and concepts. The infinite is embedded 
in mathematics as method, we can assimilate methods, and we use the infinite through 
method in proofs. Even those mathematicians who would take some sort of metaphysical 
stance against the actuality of the infinite in mathematics can nevertheless follow and 
absorb a proof by mathematical induction.
 There is a final, large point in this direction. As mathematics has expanded with 
the incorporation of the infinite, several voices have advocated the restriction of proof 
procedures and methods. Brouwer and Weyl were early figures and Bishop, a recent one. 
How are we to take all this? We now have a good grasp of intuitionistic and constructivist 
approaches to mathematics as various explicit, worked-out systems. We also have a good 
understanding of hierarchies of infinitistic methods through quantifier complexity, proof 
theory, reverse mathematics and the like. Commitments to the infinite can be viewed as the 
assimilation of methods along hierarchies. Be that as it may, an ecumenical approach to the 
infinite is what seems to be called for: There is no metamathematics, in that how we are able 
to argue about resources and methods is itself mathematical. As restrictive approaches were 
advocated, they themselves have been brought into the fold of mathematics, the process 
itself having mathematical content. Proofs about various provabilities are themselves 
significant proofs. It is interesting to carry out a program to see how far a strictly finitist 
or predicativist approach to mathematics can go, not to emasculate mathematics or to 
tout the one true way, but to find new, informative proofs and to gain an insight into the 
resources at play, particularly with regard to commitments to infinity.
 Stepping back, the study of the infinite in mathematics urges us to  develop a larger 
ecumenicism about the role of the infinite. Like the modern ecumenical approach to 
proofs in all their variety and complexity, proofs about resources provide new mathematical 
insights about the workings of method. Even then, in relation to later “elementary” proofs 
or formalized proofs in an elementary system of a statement, prior proofs may well retain 
an irreducible semantic content. In this content reside robustly aspects of the infinite, 
displaying the autonomy of mathematics as an evolving practice.
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